as irrational. What does it mean for love to believe all things about one's neighbor, and further, how can one possibly avoid being deceived? Is it not appropriate at least occasionally to be skeptical about others whom we deem untrustworthy in character?
In what follows I will explicate Kierkegaard's argument in Fragments that belief is as viable an option as doubt, and then I will demonstrate how the application of this principle to Kierkegaard's ethics of love has a rational basis.
In Outlines of Pyrrhonism Sextus Empiricus juxtaposes skepticism with dogmatism and a general philosophic agnosticism. The agnostic claims that truth cannot be apprehended.
3 Dogmatists like Heraclitus and Plato think they have found the truth 4 when they assert their respective theories of non-evident opposites and invisible realities. What is lacking for the skeptic is not a belief that truth exists, but rather an accessible criterion of truth from which to judge. The skeptic hopes to avoid error and since the conclusions of such dogmatists are not compelling to the skeptic, he suspends judgment (epoche). The intended result of widespread suspension of judgment is the state of ataraxia, freedom from disturbance. In the case of the skeptics, the disturbance they hope to be free of is that caused by the anxiety of belief and the constant possibility that one's belief may be wrong. In employing a medical analogy, Martha Nussbaum describes the skeptics' treatment of the illness of belief as "the purgation of all cognitive commitment."
5
Despite such widespread suspension of judgment the skeptics did not doubt their own immediate experiences, that which was immediately evident to them 6 .
Climacus writes, "The Greek Skeptic did not deny the correctness of sensation and of 3 Sextus devotes little time to distinguishing skepticism from the position I am calling agnostic. It is not clear how his position is significantly different save the fact that skeptics still search for truth while the agnostic accepts that it cannot be found. Given the denial of a criterion of truth, however, the skeptics' ongoing commitment to seek the truth seems (in some respects) fruitless. 4 Truth is attainable, though varying degrees of certainty are admissible. 5 The Therapy . Climacus goes so far as to say that when belief is chosen doubt is excluded; it has no force. But isn't belief distinct from certain knowledge by virtue of the fact that doubt is still possible? For Climacus, doubt and belief are equally viable options, so to choose one is to choose against the other. "The conclusion of belief is no conclusion but a resolution." 13 In other words, when one chooses to believe that the star exists this is not conclusive (we still lack sure knowledge that it exists), but rather, in being a "resolution" the belief is a decision I have made, and as a decision it is an expression of my will. When we turn to Works of Love we will examine more thoroughly what it means that belief is an expression of the will. Obviously Kierkegaard does not think that the average person who informs her friend that she saw a star would refer to the sighting of the star in terms of belief.
11 According to Evans, Kierkegaard maintains two distinct meanings of the word knowledge (see, "Realism and Antirealism", 165). The sense of knowledge employed throughout this discussion requires the kind of certainty that classical foundationalism thought was necessary. Kierkegaard thinks we have very little of this sort of knowledge. However, the second meaning of knowledge does not carry with it the requirement of absolute certainty, so in this sense, Kierkegaard would say we have this kind of knowledge of all sorts of things, e.g. our existence, what we ate for breakfast, our spouse's favorite ice cream flavor, etc. While we have the weaker sort of knowledge that a star exists, we lack the stronger sort of knowledge of the same proposition. Kierkegaard, in part, hopes to make the distinction between these two types of knowledge clear, so that we recognize that the stronger version is very rare (and its requirement is unnecessarily high) and the weak version relies in an important way on belief ("Realism and Antirealism", 166 If the skeptic ends up with such vices, should we not be fair and consider the vices that apply to the believer: namely, light-mindedness, naiveté, shallowness, weakness, credulity. Kierkegaard anticipates that the believer and especially the one who believes all things will be misunderstood. "The confusion is quite natural," he admits. 32 Nevertheless, these descriptors do not apply to the one who believes all things, the one who loves. But how can it be that one who believes all things, the one who loves, is never deceived? Before defending the legitimacy of this position it might be helpful to discuss the larger project of Works of Love, and why I have assumed that 'love' and 'mistrust', the terms that appear in this chapter, can be understood as analogues to belief and doubt, the terms of Fragments.
In the first half have been praised throughout history by countless poets, neighborly love comes from a command of Christ and is unique, or so Kierkegaard argues, to the JudeoChristian faith. What sets neighbor love apart from erotic love and friendship is its non-preferential nature. Whereas the two 'pagan' kinds of love are directed toward the individuals of one's choosing, neighbor love is directed to the one who is my neighbor, namely everyone I see. The task is obviously momentous, but Kierkegaard does not shy away from its demand because it appears impossible. Because it is a command of Christ we are obliged to love in this way.
In the chapter under discussion Kierkegaard draws upon the Apostle Paul's famous litany of love in his letter to the church at Corinth. Love believes all things.
More specifically, the one who loves with neighbor love believes all things. What does it mean to believe all things? Is not such an ethic the epitome of gullibility? The notion that love believes all things pertains specifically to how one construes her neighbor in a particularly loving way. Kierkegaard concedes that "experience will teach that it is most sagacious 33 not to believe everything". 34 But experience and what one determines based on outward appearances are not always reliable indications of truth. Those whose outer appearance is unlovely may be concealing a deeper side of themselves. It is possible that those who appear unlovely are actually very loving. "The one who loves, who believes all things, is not directly manifest. He is like those plants whose propagation is hidden-he breathes in God; he draws nourishment for his love from God, he is strengthened by God." 35 The primary concern of the sagacious person is to avoid being deceived. Surely if one believes all things she is bound to fall prey to deception. Hence, the sagacious one mistrusts.
The important alliance between mistrust and doubt can be confirmed when 33 A better translation of the Danish term klogskab might be clever, shrewd, or calculating. 34 Ibid., 226. 35 Ibid., 244.
considering the following quote that opposes the claim that knowledge is on the side of the doubter, when, as we saw above, it is neutral with regard to doubt and belief.
The deception is that from knowledge (the pretense and the falsity are that it is by virtue of knowledge) mistrust concludes, assumes, and believes what it concludes, assumes, and believes by virtue of the disbelief inherent in mistrust, whereas from the same knowledge, by virtue of belief, one can conclude, assume, and believe the very opposite. To build up is to presuppose love; to be loving is to presuppose love; only love builds up. To build up is to erect something from the ground up-but, spiritually, love is the ground of everything. No human being can place the ground of love in another person's heart; yet love is the ground, and we can build up only from the ground up; therefore we can build up only by presupposing love.
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Presupposing love involves a belief that God has equally placed love deep within every human heart. Outward assessment may suggest the contrary. It may appear that some people have no love within them, but Kierkegaard has a strong theologically-rooted egalitarianism wherein every human being possesses the same capacity to love primarily because every human being is a creation of God, who, in creating, demonstrated his love for human beings. The one who loves with neighbor love is therefore never deceived in "believing all things", because she presupposes love within the neighbor, whether or not the love is visible. To believe all things, then, is a way of construing the neighbor as one who, by virtue of the fact that she was created by a loving God, has as the ground of her being, love. That one is not deceived in believing all things is thus qualified by the notion that in presupposing love in one's neighbor, one is never wrong, despite outward appearances.
Another reason why the one who loves with neighbor love is never deceived returns us to our previous discussion about the good. we draw from what we think we know are not so certain. That is, the child may know that the bully harmed him, but this action still requires interpretation. Perhaps the bully is abused at home. While such knowledge might not justify the bully's actions, it would in fact help the victim to be more forgiving toward the bully.
Second, Kierkegaard obviously realizes that people who follow this policy will sometimes be wrong. The child beaten up on the playground may respond to the bully in forgiveness, and yet it turns out that the bully had no good reasons for his action but some arbitrary Augustinian pear-stealing reasons. In this case the child's charitable response to being harmed seems mistaken. Kierkegaard believes that overall, folks who are mistaken in ways like this are not deceived because they grasp what love really is. That is, they grasp the truth that at each person's core is a 42 Ibid., 235. 43 1 st John 4:7-8. 44 Admitting, for the time being, that such things we 'know' may lack some degree of certainty. ground of love placed there by a loving Creator. In this sense, the victim who construes his bully by presupposing love as the ground of his being, not only is not deceived, but in an important sense, seems to know the bully better than the bully knows himself. The one who seeks to protect herself from being mistaken in such ways, the one Kierkegaard calls "sagacious", ultimately misses out on what love really is because she fails to believe that love grounds each human being. In the end, the sagacious one is deceived by failing to presuppose love in the other.
That love believes all things and is never deceived rests, therefore, on both philosophical and theological supports fleshed out most richly in Works of Love.
Having granted the skeptic's denial of certain knowledge based upon inferential judgments about experience, Kierkegaard goes further when he claims that one need not doubt everything nor claim sure knowledge, but instead one can believe with just as much justification as the doubter-just as much access to knowledge. Moreover, when applying this to his ethics of love, Kierkegaard presents reasoned arguments that show how believing all things in love is the basis for a coherent ethical outlook.
Ultimately the decision to love with neighbor love and to believe all things rests in a choice of the will that presupposes the Creator's love within every created human being. This choice is not irrational but rests on the belief that the highest good is worth risking one's life for, even if the possibility of error remains.
